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1 Introduction
This paper belongs to the intersection of monopoly price theory and game
theory. Monopoly or oligopoly price theory traditionally assumes that buy-
ers are not engaged in any strategic interaction. Given the prices quoted
by competing sellers, a buyer solves a simple decision problem, choosing the
product that maximizes her utility. When preferences and costs are com-
mon knowledge, the prediction of the theory is also straightforward. First,
monopoly power does not distort decisions, as compared to the competitive
benchmark – if the buyer seeks to purchase one of several competing goods,
price competition between the sellers will ensure that she chooses the option
or product that maximizes social surplus (the diﬀerence between her valu-
ation and the cost of production). Second, the seller of this product earns
proﬁts that equal his marginal contribution to social welfare, that is the dif-
ference the between social surplus from the consumption of this product, and
that arising from the consumption of the next best option.
Buyers are often engaged in strategic interaction, and the utilities of the
diﬀerent options are not ﬁxed, but depend upon the actions of other agents.
This is especially true in the market for intermediate goods, where the buyer
is often a ﬁrm that is engaged in strategic interaction with other ﬁrms. For
example, for a ﬁrm that is considering buying advertising services, the payoﬀ
to advertising may also depend upon whether or not a competing ﬁrm also
advertises. This paper investigates how the two main insights above – no
distortion, and proﬁts equal marginal contribution — generalize when the
agent is involved in a game.
The paper may also be seen as addressing a lacuna in economic applica-
tions of game theory, where it is standard to treat a game in isolation from
the wider economic environment in which it is played. In most economic
contexts a player has to transact with another party in order to take some
action in the game. For instance, a ﬁrm that invests in order to deter entry
will normally have to purchase one or more investment goods (from a supplier
of investment goods) in order to make this investment. Treating the game
in isolation from the wider economic environment is well justiﬁed when this
environment is perfectly competitive, for in this case, the prices that must
be paid by a player for any inputs required to take an action may be treated
as exogenous. Thus payoﬀs associated with any action proﬁle are therefore
ﬁxed. However, if supplier of an input required for an action possesses mar-
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ket power, then he will typically have some leeway in setting the prices. The
consequences are two fold. First, the terms of contract dictated by suppliers
will aﬀect players’ payoﬀs, and will therefore potentially aﬀect the outcome
of the game. Second, the action proﬁle played will have payoﬀ consequences
for suppliers, who will in turn seek to inﬂuence these actions.
In this paper we analyze situations where players have to contract with
suppliers in order to take actions in a strategic form game. We model this
as an extensive form game where suppliers quote prices, and then players
choose actions simultaneously – we call this a game played in a contracting
environment. Our focus is on the competition between suppliers who provide
inputs for distinct actions. To this end we assume that any supplier is in-
volved with at most one action, for a single player.1 Contracts can either be
public (i.e. observed by all the players in the game) or private (observed only
by contracting parties). In the case of private contracts, we provide a sharp
characterization of equilibrium outcomes. Our main ﬁnding is that supplier
market power does not alter the equilibrium distribution over player actions,
as compared to a situation where market power is absent and inputs are
supplied competitively. Furthermore, any supplier earns his marginal contri-
bution to a player’s payoﬀ. We therefore ﬁnd that with private contracts, the
basic insights from non-strategic case, where the buyer solves a single person
decision problem, generalize to the strategic context.
Our results in the case of public contracts are very diﬀerent, since sup-
plier competition has subtle and complex eﬀects. Take for example the case
where the underlying game (i.e. when prices equal cost) is the prisoners’
dilemma, with a unique pure strategy equilibrium. We ﬁnd that supplier
monopoly power may result in very diﬀerent outcomes, where the players
randomize across diﬀerent actions. These phenomena arise since a supplier
to a player may be able to inﬂuence his opponent’s behavior by the choice
of price. In games where players play mixed strategies, competing suppliers
for the same player may act partially as though they are producing comple-
mentary goods, and in part as though they are producing substitutes. This
contrasts sharply with mixed equilibria in the private contracting case, where
competition between suppliers is intense.
This paper may be seen as a contribution to the literature on multi-party
contracting, which includes the literature on common agency (Bernheim and
1In contrast, the literature on strategic delegation assumes that a single supplier (the
principal) has monopoly power over the entire action set of the player (the agent).
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Whinston, [2]), and vertical contracting between a single principal and many
agents (Hart and Tirole, [8], McAfee and Schwartz, [12], Segal [14]). Its
connections are closest to the case where there are many agents as well as
principals, as in Prat and Rustichini, [13], or Jackson and Wilkie [9], where
players in the game may make side payments to other players). However,
while these papers allow general forms of contracting between principals and
agents, and focus on the question of whether contracting ensures eﬃciency,
the “principals” in our context have rather more limited power, since they
may only demand transfers in the event that the player chooses to take the
action over which they have monopoly power. Furthermore, in our context
the actions taken by the “agents” have no direct payoﬀ consequences for prin-
cipals, which is not the case in common agency models. As such, our focus is
on how equilibrium outcomes in the presence of competing monopolists diﬀer
from equilibrium outcomes under perfect competition. It is also related to
the literature on strategic delegation (Fershtman and Judd [4], Sklivas [17],
Vickers [18], Fershtman et. al. [5]), which emphasizes that delegation with
public contracts allowed a principal to secure favorable outcomes. Katz [10],
Fershtman and Kalai [6] and Kockesen and Ok [11] examine the implications
of private contracting in this context. In the strategic delegation context, an
agent requires to contract with the principal to take any action in the game,
the principal eﬀectively has monopoly power over all the actions. In contrast,
we have focus on the situation where any supplier has monopoly power over
only a single action, and thus supplier competition plays an important role.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the basic model of a game played in a contracting environment. Section
3 analyzes private contracting, while section 4 focuses on public contracts.
Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results and possible extensions, and
the ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The Model
A game played in a contracting environment is deﬁned as follows. We will use
the term player for someone who plays the game in question, and the term
supplier to denote someone with whom a player may need to contract with
in order to be able to adopt some strategy in the game. Let I = {1, 2, ..., n}
be the set of players and let each player i have a ﬁnite action set Ai, whose
generic element will also be denoted by aji or ai. Let A = ×i∈IAi be the set of
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action proﬁles, and let gi : A → R be the gross payoﬀ of player i. These gross
payoﬀs at the proﬁle a = (ai)i∈I will in general diﬀer from the usual (net)
payoﬀs of a player since she may have to contract with a supplier in order
to be able to play the action ai. Let A¯i ⊂ Ai be the set of actions for which
the player needs a supplier. We shall assume that for any player i and any
action aji ∈ A¯i , there exists exactly one supplier, λ(aij). We may identify
this supplier with the action, and with a slight abuse of terminology, call
him supplier aji or supplier ij. Λi = {λ(aij)}j∈A¯i denotes the set of suppliers
for player i. Let pji denote the price which is charged by supplier λ(aij) for
enabling the action aji , and let pi = (p
j
i )j∈A¯i . If a
j
i /∈ A¯i we set the price of
this action, pji , to zero. The net payoﬀ at the proﬁle a = (a
j
i , a−i) where a−i
is the vector of actions of players h = i, is given by
ui(a, pi) = gi(a
j
i , a−i)− pji . (1)
If player i plays action j and aji ∈ A¯i , the payoﬀ to supplier ij is given by
pji − cji , where cji is the cost of supplying this action. If the player does not
play action aji , the payoﬀ to the supplier is zero. Let us normalize prices and
gross payoﬀs by measuring them net of cost, so that a zero price corresponds
to pricing at cost. Henceforth, the gross payoﬀ gi(ai, a−i) will denote the
payoﬀ when player pays the cost of action ai. We extend, in the usual way,
the gross payoﬀ function gi to mixed action proﬁles: gi(αi, α−i) is the payoﬀ
to αi ∈ ∆(Ai) when α−i ∈ ×h =i∆(Ah) is the vector of (mixed) actions played
by the other players.
In comparison with common agency models [2] or games played through
agents (Prat and Rustichini [13]), our formulation diﬀers in two respects.
First, the actions taken by the players have no payoﬀ consequences for sup-
pliers whereas principals directly care about the actions taken by agents in
common agency models. This implies that the suppliers in our setting have
no reason to make transfers to the agents. Their monopoly power allows
them to demand transfers, but this power is only relevant in the event that a
player takes the monopolized action. In contrast, in common agency models,
principals are assumed to have no direct monopoly power – the agent can
always take any action without making any payment to any principal. One
assumption in our formulation deserves comment. The payment to supplier
λ(aji ) is contingent only on whether the action a
j
i has been played or not. In
particular, it cannot be made contingent upon the entire action proﬁle that
is played. This reﬂects the assumption that in the relation between player i
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and supplier λ(aji ), it is veriﬁable whether action a
j
i has been enabled by the
latter or not – in particular, some physical good may need to be delivered
by λ(aji ) in order to enable a
j
i . On the other hand, the action proﬁle that
is played is assumed not to be veriﬁable, preventing transfers from being
conditioned on the proﬁle.
A point of reference, before we proceed to analysis of the extensive form
games, is the normal form game G =< I,A, g >, i.e. where all actions
are supplied at cost, and players net payoﬀs equal their gross payoﬀs. The
payoﬀs we write down, in the various examples, will be of the game G. Let
EG denote the set of Nash equilibria of G. Let α = (aji , a−i) ∈ EG, where
player i plays the pure action aji . Deﬁne δi(α) = gi(α)−maxk =j gi(aki , aj−i) as
player i’s deviation loss from his pure action at α. If player i plays a mixed
action at α, δi(α) = 0. If a supplier is needed in order to take action a
j
i , δi(α)
may be thought of as the marginal contribution made by (active) supplier ij
to player i’s gross payoﬀ at the proﬁle α. These marginal contributions will
play an important role in our characterization results.
We have two possible extensive forms to analyze: private contracts and
public contracts. The contracting game with private contracts, Γpvt, is as
follows:
1. Each supplier in Λ = ∪i∈IΛi quotes a price for each input that he
supplies.
2. Each player i observes the price vector pi (but not the prices quoted
to other players), and players simultaneously choose actions ai ∈ Ai.
3. Players receive the net payoﬀs as deﬁned above, and suppliers receive
their payoﬀs.
If we replace (2) above so that every player observes (pi)i∈I , the prices
quoted to all, we have a game with public contracts, which we can call Γpub.
In either game, a (pure) strategy for a supplier is a price, i.e. a real
number. In the game with private contracts, a pure strategy for player i is
a function si : R
mi → Ai, where mi is the cardinality of Λi.In the game with
public contracts, a pure strategy is a map si : ×jRmj → Ai. Both these games
are an instance of a continuum extensive form game, in the terminology of
Simon and Stinchcombe [15].We will restrict attention to perfect Bayesian
equilibria of these extensive form games. In the case of public contracts, these
are the same as subgame perfect equilibria. In addition, we want to rule out
“unreasonable equilibria”, where inactive suppliers (i.e. those who do not
make a sale) choose strictly negative prices. Such equilibria are sometimes
called cautious, and can be ruled out by considerations of trembling hand
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perfection.2 So henceforth, by “equilibrium” we mean a cautious perfect
Bayesian equilibrium where all supplier prices are non-negative.
3 Private Contracts
We make explicit our assumptions on the relation between players and sup-
pliers. First, we assume that each supplier is a monopolist in the market
for the action that he enables. This assumption is easily relaxed. Our other
assumptions are as follows.
Assumption A1. (No Complementary Inputs): For any player i and any
action aji , no more than one supplier is required.
Assumption A2: Each player has at least two actions
If a player was to have only one action, the supplier enabling that action
would have completely inelastic demand.
Assumption A3. A supplier supplies at most one player, i.e. Λi and Λj
are disjoint if i = j.
This assumption plays an essential role in our analysis of private contracts,
since it ensures that the beliefs of player i regarding the actions chosen by
other players do not vary with the prices that player i is quoted by her
supplier.
Assumption A4. A supplier supplies at most one action of any player,
i.e. if j = k, λ(aji ) = λ(aki ).
This assumption is less essential for our results and is made mainly for
expositional convenience.
Restricting attention to deterministic price choices by suppliers,3 a strat-
egy proﬁle in Γpvt consists of a pair (pˆ, σ), where pˆ is the vector of prices
chosen by all suppliers, and for each player i, σi : R
mi → ∆(Ai). The (mixed)
action proﬁle which is played under this strategy proﬁle is σ(pˆ) = (σi(pˆi))i∈I ,
and is called the action outcome of this proﬁle. Clearly, the set of action
2More precisely, we can discretize the price space, and consider trembling hand perfect
equilibria of the discretized game. We may restrict attention to equilibria of the continuum
game which are limit points of a sequence of trembling hand equilibria of discrete games
as the grid of prices becomes increasingly ﬁner. It is easy to see that any equilibrium with
negative prices will not be a limit of such trembling hand perfect equilibria.
3This assumption does not appear to be essential for our results in the case of private
contracts, but simpliﬁes notation and exposition. However, in the case of public contracts,
supplier randomization enlarges strategic possibilities signiﬁcantly by enabling players to
correlate their actions.
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outcomes of Γpvt coincide with the set of mixed action proﬁles in G, i.e.
σ(pˆ) ∈ ×i∆(Ai). Let ΩΓpvt denote the set of equilibrium action outcomes of
Γpvt. Let σ−i(pˆ) ∈ ×h =i∆(Ah) denote the beliefs of player i regarding the
actions taken by the other players. By assumption A3, the beliefs of player i
regarding the actions of other players do not vary if the prices that he faces,
pi, change. Also, for player i, only the prices he faces (pi) and the actions of
other players are payoﬀ relevant. The prices paid by other players are payoﬀ
irrelevant.
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 ΩΓ
pvt
= EG, the equilibrium action outcomes of Γpvt and the
equilibria of G coincide. Let (pˆ, σ) be an equilibrium of Γpvt with action out-
come α. If αi assigns probability one to action a
j
i , then pˆij = δi(α). If αi
assigns positive probability to more than one action, then pˆij = 0 for every
active supplier ij.
Proof. See Appendix.
If we allowed for equilibria with negative prices, the only diﬀerence that
is that when i plays a pure action, pˆij could be any number in the interval
[0, δi(α)].
Although the monopoly power of suppliers allow them to charge non-
negative prices, thereby causing net payoﬀs to diﬀer from gross payoﬀs, the
theorem shows that this does not alter the equilibrium distribution over ac-
tion proﬁles in Γpvt. Furthermore, when the proﬁle α is played at an equilib-
rium of Γpvt, supplier ij gets a payoﬀ which equals his marginal contribution
to player i’s gross payoﬀ at α. A supplier’s marginal contribution is gener-
ically positive when a pure action is played, but equals zero for any mixed
action.
L H
L 1, 1 0, 0
H 0, 0 2, 2
Fig. 1: A Coordination Game
The example in Fig. 1, a coordination game, will illustrate our results.
Let us consider an equilibrium where (L,L) is played. The equilibrium prices
faced by a player, say the row player, must satisfy p(L) = 1 and p(H) =
0.Thus the prices (which equal proﬁts) of the supplier 1L to the row player
equals 1. The net payoﬀ of the row player is therefore zero. Note that prices
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are such that H weakly dominates L. Nevertheless, this equilibrium is a limit
of perfect equilibria of the discretized version of the game — with discrete
prices, equilibrium prices will be such that each player has a strict incentive to
play L.4 If we consider any equilibrium where the players randomize between
their two actions, then all prices must equal zero, and hence the each player
must play his ﬁrst action with probability 2
3
. The net payoﬀs of the players
equals 2
3
, and hence the players beneﬁt by “not-coordinating” and playing
the mixed equilibrium of G, since this improves their position vis-a-vis the
supplier.
We have established that if player i randomizes between any two actions,
say j and k, in an equilibrium of Γpvt, then the prices paid to these suppliers
is zero. Suppliers of diﬀerent actions act as though there are producing
goods which are perfect substitutes. We call this condition a generalized
indiﬀerence principle for mixed strategies with private contracts, since the
suppliers as well as the player are indiﬀerent between his choice of actions. On
the other hand, when player i plays action aji in a pure strategy equilibrium
(pˆ, σ), supplier ij will in general make positive proﬁts. The proﬁts that ij
makes equal δi(a
j), which will generically be strictly positive. When we
consider more complicated extensive form games, this distinction between
the incentive constraints faced by a supplier at a pure action proﬁle and the
constraints faced at a mixed action proﬁle has subtle eﬀects. In particular,
it implies that supplier incentives may be qualitatively diﬀerent at player
action proﬁles that are arbitrarily close together. The implications of this are
explored in a companion paper (Bhaskar [3]). This paper shows that shows
that imperfect observability generates a failure of lower-hemicontinuity of
equilibrium outcomes in extensive games that are played in a contracting
environment.
4Simon and Stinchcombe [15] develop a theory of equilibrium reﬁnement for inﬁnite
normal form games, and argue that a minimal condition for reasonableness in such games
is limit admissibility, i.e. that equilibrium strategies should be limits of admissible (un-
dominated) strategies. In our contracting extensive form game, limit admissibility in con-
junction with sequentiality precludes existence. Although the coordination game example
possesses a limit admissible equilibrium, where the mixed strategy equilibrium is played,
this will not be the case in general, as can be seen from the example of the prisoner’s
dilemma (see Fig. 2, subsection 4.1), where  > g1 and  > g2.
9
4 Public Contracts
We now consider public contracts. Recall that with public contracts, a (pure)
strategy for a supplier is a price, i.e. a real number. A mixed strategy
for a player is a map si : ×jRmj → ∆(Ai). We focus on subgame perfect
equilibrium. As before, we may require additionally that prices are non-
negative even for inactive suppliers. Let Γpub denote the game with public
contracts, and let ΩΓ
pub
denote the set of equilibrium action outcomes.
Our ﬁrst concern is to ensure existence of equilibrium. Assumption A2 is
no longer suﬃcient to ensure existence of equilibrium. We therefore replace
it with the following:
Assumption A5. For every player i there exists an action a0i such that no
input is required to play this action.
This assumption ensures that the minimum payoﬀ that any player in I can
receive is bounded and given by mina−i gi(a
0
i , a−i).
5Therefore the maximum
price that any supplier ij can charge and possibly make a sale is no greater
than maxa−i gi(a
j
i , a−i) − mina−i gi(a0i , a−i). Hence the strategy set for any
supplier is in eﬀect compact, since higher prices cannot be optimal. Let us
now assume that there exists a public signal which is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]. We assume that suppliers cannot observe the realization of this
random variable while choosing prices, but that players observe this before
choosing their actions. It is easily veriﬁed that players’ payoﬀs as well as
supplier payoﬀs are continuous in the strategies. By the results of Simon and
Zame [16] and Harris, Reny and Robson [7], there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium of this game. 6
With public contracts, equilibrium outcomes are surprisingly complex,
even in simple games such as the prisoners’ dilemma. Our focus is on the
question, under what conditions is an equilibrium of G an equilibrium action
outcome of Γpub. When G has multiple equilibria, these conditions are easy
to satisfy. The question is more interesting when G has a unique equilib-
rium. We therefore consider, in turn, games G with a unique pure strategy
equilibrium, then those with a unique mixed equilibrium, and ﬁnally games
5We are unable to establish boundedness in the absence of A5 – the mixed strategy
example in section 4.2 may help clarify why this is the case, although in fact A5 is not
required for existence in this speciﬁc example.
6In the examples we consider in this paper, we do not have invoke a public randomiza-
tion device in order to ensure existence.
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with multiple equilibria.
4.1 Games with a unique pure strategy equilibrium
Let us consider ﬁrst as an example, the prisoners’ dilemma game below,
where for each player, playing D requires a contracting with a supplier, but
playing C does not. This simple game, when played in a public contracting
context, displays a surprising complexity of equilibrium behavior.
C D
C 1, 1 −, 1 + g2
D 1 + g1,− 0, 0
Fig. 2: Prisoners’ Dilemma: g1, g2,  > 0
Recall that theorem 1 ensures that in Γpvt, the game with private con-
tracting, (D,D) must be played and each active supplier earns , his marginal
contribution at (D,D). We now show that if g1 >  and g2 < , then there
does not exist any equilibrium of Γpub where (D,D) is played. To see this,
let suppose that (D,D) is played with probability one in an equilibrium. We
must have pi ≤  for i ∈ {1, 2}, since otherwise playing D is not optimal. We
now show that p2 =  if (D,D) is played. If p2 < , supplier 2 can increase his
price, while still keeping it less than . In the induced subgame, player 1 ﬁnds
it strictly optimal to play D if player 2 plays C, and is indiﬀerent between
C and D if player 2 plays D. Thus 1 can only play C if two plays D with
probability one. Therefore, if two plays D with probability less than one,
one must play D with probability one, in which case playing D is optimal
for two. Thus in any equilibrium of induced subgame, two continues to play
D with probability one, making supplier 2’s price increase proﬁtable.
We conclude therefore that any candidate equilibrium where (D,D) is
played, we must have p2 = . However, if p2 = , supplier 1 has a proﬁtable
deviation. If he chooses p1 ∈ (, g1), then (D,D) is no longer an equilibrium.
Indeed, in induced subgame, action D is weakly dominated for player 2, and
in any equilibrium, player 1 must play D with probability one, while player
2 plays C with suﬃciently high probability in order to make this optimal
(since  > p1 > g1). Thus supplier 1 has a proﬁtable price increase, since he
can increase his price above  without reducing the probability of a sale. We
have therefore demonstrated that there does not exist an equilibrium where
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(D,D) is played with probability one. Indeed, since no other action proﬁle
is a Nash equilibrium of G, there does not exist an equilibrium where any
pure action proﬁle is played.
We now show that there exists an equilibrium where sellers randomize
between prices, inducing a correlated distribution over action proﬁles. First,
notice that if seller 2 chooses the price , then seller 1 can choose a higher
price, at g1 or arbitrarily close to g1, and in the resulting subgame, seller
2 makes a sale with probability arbitrarily close to zero. Seller 2’s best
response is therefore to choose a price of g1, which ensures a sale for sure.
On the other hand, if seller 2 chooses g1, seller 1’s cannot make a sale by
choosing a price higher than ; his best response is to choose , which ensures
a sale with probability one. Each seller can achieve a payoﬀ arbitrarily close
to min{, gi} by choosing a price below this number, and therefore in any
equilibrium, D must be played with positive probability by each player. We
now show that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies, where both
each seller randomizes between two prices,  and gi. The table in Fig. 3
speciﬁes equilibrium actions by the two players for each price proﬁle. Let πi
denote the probability that supplier i chooses . If π2 =

g1
and π1 =
g2

, then
each two supplier is indiﬀerent between the two prices.7
g2 
 D,D D,D
g1 C,D D,C
Fig. 3: Actions as a function of supplier prices
Although the prisoners’ dilemma game G has a unique equilibrium (D,D),
we ﬁnd that this is not an equilibrium action outcome of Γpub. Indeed, equi-
librium action outcome is a correlated distribution over the set of action pro-
7It is easy to verify that supplier prices other than gi and  are not optimal at this
equilibirum. Since no player will play D if pi > max{gi, }, and will play D for sure if
pi < min{gi, }, prices outside the interval are sub-optimal (notice is that if pi = min{gi, },
then D is played for sure in the equilibrium, regardless of the realization of pj). Suppose
that supplier 1 chooses a price p1 ∈ (, g1). If supplier 2 chooses g2, then it is easily veriﬁed
that D is weakly dominant for player 2, and that D cannot be played by player 1 in any
equilibrium of this subgame. Thus p1 and  yield the same payoﬀ of zero in this event.
On the other hand, if supplier 2 chooses , then D must be played with probability one in
this subgame, and therefore the price of  yields more proﬁts than any lower price in this
event. Similar reasoning veriﬁes that intermediate prices between g2 and  are dominated
for supplier 2 as well.
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ﬁles, since under this distribution all proﬁles other than (C,D) have strictly
positive probability.
We now set out the conditions that must be satisﬁed for an unique pure
equilibrium of G to be played in the game Γpub. Let a∗ be a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of G. We say that the marginal contribution of supplier a∗i
is maximal at a∗ if
a∗−i ∈ arg max
a−i∈A−i
{
gi(a
∗
i , a−i)− max
ai =a∗i
gi(ai, a−i)
}
.
Similarly, the marginal contribution of supplier a∗i is minimal at a
∗ if
a∗−i ∈ arg min
a−i∈A−i
{
gi(a
∗
i , a−i)− max
ai =a∗i
gi(ai, a−i)
}
.
In our prisoners’ dilemma example, the marginal contribution of supplier
1 is maximal at (D,D) if  ≥ g1, and it is minimal if  ≤ g1. Note that these
deﬁnitions also apply when the player does not require to contract with any
supplier in order to take action a∗i . The following theorems provides suﬃcient
conditions under which a pure strategy equilibrium of G is played in Γpub.
Theorem 2 Let a∗ be a pure strategy equilibrium of G, such that either
i) for every player i, the marginal contribution of supplier λ(a∗i ) is maximal
at a∗, or ii) for every player i, the marginal contribution of supplier λ(a∗i )
is minimal at a∗. Then there exists an equilibrium of Γpub with outcome a∗,
where each active supplier earns his marginal contribution δi(a
∗).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the prisoners’ dilemma, (D,D) is an equilibrium action outcome of
Γpub when either  ≥ max{g1, g2} or  ≤ max{g1, g2}. In the former case,
the marginal contribution of each active supplier is minimal at (D,D), and
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium has each active supplier earning his
marginal contribution, . In the latter case, the marginal contribution of
each active supplier is maximal at (D,D); consequently, there exist equilibria
where active suppliers earn their marginal contribution , but there also exist
equilibria where they earn payoﬀs in the interval [gi, ].
8
8For any p¯i ∈ [gi,  ], there exists an equilibrium where supplier i chooses p¯i and (D,D)
is played with probability one on the equilibrium path. A player chooses D as long as
p1 ≤ p¯1 and p2 ≤ p¯2. If either supplier deviates by choosing a higher price, both players
play (C,C).
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The suﬃcient conditions required for the theorem are rather strong, since
they require either that the marginal contributions of active suppliers are
maximal for all suppliers, or that they are all minimal. Our prisoners’
dilemma example shows why rather strong assumptions are required if a
pure strategy equilibrium of G is to continue to be an equilibrium outcome
of Γpub. Even if a proﬁle a∗ is a pure strategy equilibrium of G, there may
be a supplier for action a∗i who may be able to secure a higher payoﬀ than
his marginal contribution δi(a
∗) by inducing some other player j to play a
diﬀerent action.
4.2 Games with a unique mixed equilibrium
Let us now consider the properties of equilibria of Γpubwhere a player ran-
domizes between diﬀerent actions, aji and a
k
i . In the private contracts case,
we saw that this lead to intense competition between the suppliers, ij and
ik. This is very much as though these suppliers were supplying perfectly sub-
stitutable goods. In the case of public contracts, we show that things are
dramatically diﬀerent – it is as though the two suppliers are supplying com-
plementary goods. To see this, let us consider the game in Fig. 4, matching
pennies game where the row player has an outside option, OUT. We assume
that 0 < b < a/2 so that the game G has a unique mixed equilibrium where
the player 1 (the row player) plays T and B each with probability one-half,
while player 2 chooses both her actions with equal probability. In the cor-
responding game with public contracts, player 2 does not have to contract
with anyone to play either L or R, so that net payoﬀs equal her gross payoﬀs.
Player faces a single supplier in the case of action T and also in the case of
action B, but can play OUT without contracting with anyone.
L R
T a, 0 0, 1
B 0, 1 a, 0
OUT b, 0 b, 0
Fig. 4: Matching Pennies with an Outside Option: 0 < 2b < a.
We will discuss two diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. First, we assume
that b ≥ 0, so that the outside option bites (b ≥ 0). In this case, it is as
though the two suppliers, of T and B, are producing a complementary inputs
for single good – the randomization that mixes these two actions equally. Let
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x, y denote the prices to be paid for playing T and B respectively. Let us
exclude OUT from consideration for the moment. Now given this restricted
subgame, given y, supplier T can make a sale for sure by choosing x = y−a−ε,
and can therefore get a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to y− a. Alternatively, T can
also choose a price in the interval (y−a, y+a), in which case the (restricted)
subgame has a completely mixed equilibrium where T and B are played with
equal probability and the column player plays L with probability π = 1
2
+ x−y
2a
.
The expected payoﬀ to row in this equilibrium equals a−(x+y)
2
. This must be
greater than b or else OUT will be better for row. Now, the probability with
which T is played equals one-half, independent of the value of x or y, so long
as |x− y| ≤ a. This is so because this probability is such that column is kept
indiﬀerent between his two actions, and hence it does not depend upon the
prices row pays. Hence supplier T seeks to choose x to maximize x
2
subject
to the constraint a−(x+y)
2
≥ b, and supplier B seeks to choose y to maximize
y
2
, also subject to the same constraint. Hence the equilibria are non-negative
values of x, y such that
x + y = a− 2b > 0. (2)
Thus we have a continuum of equilibria, where x and y satisfy the above
equation, where x and y are subject to the further constraint that the payoﬀ
of each supplier is greater in this equilibrium than from making a sale for
sure. Notice that for supplier T, the highest price for y in any such candidate
equilibrium is y = a − 2b, at which supplier T makes a proﬁt of zero at
x = 0 by sharing the market. By undercutting, he can earn y − a, i.e.
−2b, and therefore as long as b ≥ 0, each element of this continuum is an
equilibrium. To conclude, we have demonstrated that as long as b ≥ 0,
we have a continuum of equilibria x, y ∈ [0, a − 2b] , where the probability
with which L is played varies between 0 and 1. This is very similar to the
situation where there are two monopoly producers of perfect complementary
goods – equilibrium prices must sum to the value to the consumer of the
composite good. This example also illustrates that action proﬁles which are
not an equilibrium of G may be sustained as equilibrium outcomes of Γpub.
Let x = y = a − 2b. In this case, the resulting subgame has an equilibrium
where row plays OUT and column chooses any mixed action. Each supplier
chooses a high price since the price of the other supplier is so high that only
a zero price can ensure a sale. This is an example of a ineﬃciency due to
excessively high pricing by producers of complementary goods, in the mixed
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strategy context.
Let us now consider the second case, where the value to the outside
option, b, is suﬃciently negative that it becomes irrelevant. For expositional
simplicity, let us assume that it no longer exists, i.e. b = −∞. In this case,
it is as though the goods oﬀered by the two suppliers are partly complements
but also partly substitutes. We show ﬁrst that this game does not have an
equilibrium where supplier prices are deterministic. To see this, note that
supplier T can ensure himself a payoﬀ arbitrarily close to a/2, by choosing
a price equal to a − ε, since in this event play of T is not dominated, and
T must be played with probability at least one-half. So in any deterministic
price equilibrium, T and B must be played with probability one-half. But in
this case, any ε-optimal best response for T is x = y + a − ε, and similarly
y = x + a− ε, so that each supplier wants to price higher than his rival. So
there cannot be a deterministic price equilibrium.
Let us now consider mixed price equilibria. Consider a symmetric mixed
equilibrium where the price chosen by each supplier, x has support [x, x¯],
and continuous distribution F. The payoﬀ to a supplier from choosing x is
given by
U(x, F ) = x[1− F (x + a)] + x
2
[F (x + a)− F (x− a)]. (3)
∂U
∂x
= 2− [F (x+a)+F (x−a)]−x[F ′(x+a)+F ′(x−a)] = 0, x ∈ [x, x¯]. (4)
The solution to this diﬀerential equation is given by
F (x + a) + F (x− a) = 2 + k
x
, x ∈ [x, x¯]. (5)
We show ﬁrst that x and x¯ must satisfy some inequality constraints. Let y
denote my opponent’s price. Since y ≥ 0, the best response to it is either
x = y + a (if y ≤ 3a) or y − a (if y ≥ 3a). Hence any rationalizable strategy
must satisfy x ≥ a. Thus x ≥ a.
Turning now to x¯, we know that the payoﬀ from x¯ equals x¯
2
[1−F (x¯−a)].
But the payoﬀ from x¯−2a is no less than (x¯−2a)[1−F (x¯−a)], so we must
have x¯
2
≥ x¯−2a, or x¯ ≤ 4a. Finally we must have x¯−x ≥ 2a, since otherwise
at the midpoint of the support, the payoﬀ will be strictly increasing in x, and
thus this cannot be optimal. Note that we have shown that x¯− x ∈ [2a, 3a].
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We now construct an equilibrium based on equation (5). Let x > a, and
let x¯ = x + 2a. For x ∈ [x, x + a], (5) implies that
F (x) = 1− x + a
x + a
, x ∈ [x, x + a]. (6)
For [x + a, x¯], (5) implies that
F (x) = 2− x + a
x− a, x ∈ [x + a, x¯]. (7)
Since (7) and (6) must yield the same value for F (x+ a), we deduce that
1− x + a
x + 2a
= 2− x + a
x
. (8)
This implies that
x = a
√
2. (9)
The payoﬀ of the supplier in the equilibrium is given by
x + a
2
=
a(1 +
√
2)
2
. (10)
.
This completes the construction of the equilibrium. That is, we have an
equilibrium with support [a
√
2, a(
√
2 + 2)], with the associated distribution
given by equations (6) and (7). Indeed, we have also demonstrated that any
equilibrium where x¯− x = 2a coincides with our construction.
Note that the action outcome of this equilibrium is not the same as the
mixed equilibrium of G. Indeed, it corresponds to a correlated distribution
over action proﬁles in G. To see this, note that there is positive probability
that the diﬀerence in prices between supplier T and supplier B is greater
than a, in which case (B,L) is played. Similarly, the probability that this
diﬀerence is less than −a is also the same, in which case (T,R) is played.
Finally, in the case that the diﬀerence lies between −a and a, a mixed action
proﬁle is played, where the T and B are always played with probability one-
half, while the probability of L depends upon the two prices.
We now show that this equilibrium is essentially unique within this class.
Suppose that x¯ = x + 2a + ε where ε ∈ (0, a] (we have already shown that
x¯− x ≤ 3a). Consider y ∈ (x+ a, x+ a+ ε). We will show that equation (5)
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implies two diﬀerent values for F (y), and therefore a contradiction. Consider
ﬁrst the indiﬀerence condition at y − a. By equation (5) we must have
F (y) = 2 +
k
y − a. (11)
On the other hand, the indiﬀerence condition at y + a implies
F (y) = 1 +
k
y + a
. (12)
Thus we must have
k
y + a
= 1 +
k
y − a,∀y ∈ (x + a, x + a + ε). (13)
This implies that y2 − a2 + 2ak = 0 for an interval of values y, which is
clearly impossible.
To summarize, we have considered the case where G is a simple matching
pennies game with an outside option, that has a unique mixed equilibrium.
We ﬁnd that equilibria in Γpub show interesting and complex behavior. When
the outside option bites, the suppliers of the two actions act as though they
are producing complementary goods that combine to form a single compos-
ite good, that must compete with the outside option. This gives rise to
multiplicity of pricing equilibria and consequently, a continuum of equilib-
rium distributions over action proﬁles. In the case where the outside option
does not bite, we see that suppliers act partially as though they are pro-
ducing complementary goods, but also partially as producers of substitute
goods. This arises since one supplier’s price may be so high that it becomes
proﬁtable for the other to undercut this price suﬃciently to take the entire
market, i.e. make a sale with probability one. This mix between substitutes
and complements precludes existence of a deterministic price equilibrium.
We show that a mixed equilibrium exists where the distribution over prices
is continuous.
Finally, let us consider the interaction between suppliers of diﬀerent play-
ers in the context of this example. Assume now that there is a single supplier
for T for the row player, and a single supplier for L for the column player,
the other actions not requiring any contracting. Assume also that b = −∞,
i.e. the action OUT is not available for the row player. Let p be the price
chosen by the supplier for T and q be the price for L. As long as p < a and
q < 1, the resulting subgame has a unique mixed equilibrium, where row
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plays T with probability 1−q
2
, and column plays L with probability a+p
2a
. That
is, the probability with which T is played does not depend upon the price
of that action p, as long as it is less than a. Similarly, the supplier of B also
faces completely inelastic demand as long as q ≤ 1. We must therefore have
p = a, q = 1, so that the resulting subgame is given by Fig. 5.
L R
T 0,−1 −a, 1
B 0, 0 a, 0
OUT b, 0 b, 0
Fig. 5
To complete the description of subgame perfect equilibrium, (B,L) is
played at this subgame. Notice that seller T does not make a sale; however,
if he reduces price below a, then (B,R) is played, making any price reduction
unproﬁtable. Thus we see that a pure proﬁle (B,L) is played although this
is not an equilibrium of the original game.
To summarize: we have considered a classic matching pennies type game
and shown that supplier competition can yield complex results under public
contracts. Speciﬁcally, suppliers of diﬀerent actions taken by the same player
act as though they are producing complements; this can be combined with
elements of Bertrand style competition if one supplier’s price is very high.
4.3 Games with multiple equilibria
If the game G has multiple equilibria, it is rather easy to ensure that any
such equilibrium is played in a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γpub. For
example, in the coordination game of Fig. 1, one can support the play of
(L,L) at any arbitrary price pi(L) ≤ 1 (for i = 1, 2) by pricing strategies
where p(H) < 2 (for i = 1, 2), where players choose (L,L) as long as neither
L supplier has deviated, but switch to playing (H,H) in the event of a
deviation. Similarly, the mixed equilibrium can be played if equilibrium
prices are pi(L) = pi(H) = k,(for i = 1, 2) where k is some constant. If
say one of the L supplier deviates, the players respond by choosing (H,H).
The same logic allows one to support a wide range of prices, and therefore
mixed action proﬁles that are not equilibria of the normal form game G. We
therefore have the following result:
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Theorem 3 Let aj and α be distinct equilibria of G, where aj is pure and
α is such that for every i, aji is not in the support of αi.There exists an
equilibrium (pˆ, σ) of Γpub, with σ(pˆ) = aj, with pˆji ∈ [0, δi(aj)] for every
active supplier.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Robustness and Extensions
We now consider how our results would be modiﬁed if our assumptions were
changed. Since our strongest characterization results are for the case of
private contracting, we focus our discussion mainly on this case.
5.1 Competition among suppliers
We have assumed throughout each supplier has monopoly power over the
action that he is needed for. Let us assume that there is more than one source
from which the player may obtain the input required for an action, aji . Let
Λij be the set of suppliers for input ij, each of whom (indexed ijk) produces a
product which is perfectly substitutable with any other. Let ij1 be the least
cost supplier. Deﬁne the gross payoﬀ function so that the gi(a
j
i , a−i) is the
utility to player i minus the cost to ij1 of supplying action a
j
i and measure
prices of the suppliers in Λij net of the cost to ij1. Cautious equilibria are
now such that no supplier prices below cost. It is clear that basic point of
theorem 1 is unaltered in this case, i.e. the equilibrium action outcomes
Γpvt continue to coincide with equilibria of G. In the case of pure strategy
equilibria, the prices paid to supplier ij1 must now satisfy an additional
constraint, of being lower than the cost of the next best supplier in Λij. In
the case of mixed strategy equilibria of G, nothing is altered at all, and the
generalized indiﬀerence principle continues to apply.
5.2 Complementary Inputs
Assumption A1, that there are no complementary inputs necessary for tak-
ing an action, is essential for our main result. In its absence, coordination
failures can enlarge the set of equilibria, so that action proﬁles which are not
equilibria of G can be sustained as equilibrium outcomes of Γpvt. To see this
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consider a one player game, where it is eﬃcient for the player to consume a
composite good, which yields utility one, whereas the outside option of the
player yields zero. Assume that two inputs are required in order to make
up the composite good, that there is a monopoly supplier for each of these
inputs. Now if each supplier chooses a price of 1 (or greater), it is strictly
optimal to take the outside option. No supplier can beneﬁt by reducing price,
since he must choose a price of zero (or lower) to ensure a sale.
The generalized indiﬀerence principle for mixed equilibria must also be
modiﬁed in this case. Let us consider the coordination game in Fig. 1, and
let us assume that for both players, no inputs are required for action L and
that two inputs are required playing H. Let the supplier of the ﬁrst input
to row choose a price equal to one, while the supplier of the second input
randomizes, choosing a price of zero with probability 1
2
, and a price of one
with probability 1
2
. Each player chooses to play H if and only if the total price
is less than equal to one. It can be veriﬁed that this is an equilibrium, with
action outcome diﬀerent from the mixed equilibrium of G. The supplier of
the ﬁrst input makes positive proﬁts at this equilibrium while the supplier of
the second input makes zero proﬁts. The generalized indiﬀerence principle in
this context implies that at least one of the producers of the complementary
goods is indiﬀerent between making a sale or not.
5.3 Sequential Move Games
Our analysis has focused entirely on the case where the underlying game G is
a simultaneous move game, where we ﬁnd that private contracting and public
contracting yield very diﬀerent results. Consider a two player sequential
move game where one player (the leader) moves ﬁrst, and the follower moves
after observing the leader’s action. To embed this in a contracting setting,
assume that suppliers of the leader choose prices ﬁrst, while the suppliers
of the follower choose prices after observing the leader’s chosen action. The
distinction between private and public contracting becomes irrelevant in this
context – since the prices chosen by the leader’s suppliers are payoﬀ irrelevant
to the follower it makes little diﬀerence whether they are observed or not by
the follower or her suppliers. More generally, one might conjecture that when
the underlying game is one of perfect information with generic gross payoﬀs
(no ties at any terminal nodes), private and public contracting yield the same
outcomes.
We believe that the conclusion – that the form of contracting makes no
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diﬀerence — is too strong, even in this very special context. Following Bag-
well [1], one may ask, are the equilibrium outcomes of perfect information
games robust to small imperfections in observation? If one modiﬁes the se-
quential move game in a contracting environment, so that the follower (and
his supplier) have noisy observations of the leader’s choice, and restricts at-
tention to pure strategy equilibria, then it is as though we are analyzing a
simultaneous move game. On the other hand, one may consider mixed equi-
libria of the game with noisy observation in a contracting environment, where
the leader randomizes between diﬀerent actions. In this case, the analysis of
the present paper indicates that one is likely to obtain very diﬀerent results
depending upon whether one has private or public contracting. Speciﬁcally,
with public contracting, it will be as though the suppliers of the diﬀerent
actions are producing complements, whereas with private contracting, it is
as though they are producing perfect substitutes. 9
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed games where players have to contract with other suppliers
in order to take actions. As in the literature on principal-multi agent games,
we ﬁnd that it is important whether contracts are public (i.e. observed by all
the players in the game) or private (observed only by contracting parties).
We also ﬁnd that there is a major diﬀerence between mixed equilibrium in the
game, where players randomize between their actions, and pure equilibria.
In particular, the incentive constraints which apply to mixed equilibria are
dramatically diﬀerent from incentive constraints which apply to pure equi-
libria. This can have important consequences, as we show in a companion
paper (Bhaskar, [3]).
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
We ﬁrst prove the following lemma:
9Bhaskar [3] examines some of these issues in the private contracting case, and shows
that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs with almost perfect observation can be disjoint from
the set of equilibrium outcomes with perfect observation.
22
Lemma 4 (pˆ, σ) is an equilibrium of Γpvt if and only for every player i and
any action aji in the support of σi(pˆi): (i) gi(a
j
i , σ−i(pˆ))−pji ≥ gi(aki , a∗−i)−pki
for any k. (ii) If ij ∈ Λi, there exists an action aki , k = j such that gi(a∗)−
pji = gi(a
k
i , a
∗
−i)− pki , with pki ≤ 0 (iii)pji ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the necessity of these conditions ﬁrst. Condition (i) follows
from individual optimization by player i. Condition (ii) follows from Bertrand
competition between suppliers ij and ik. By assumption A3 player i’s gross
payoﬀ, as a function of his own action, does not vary with the prices pji
or pki . If the inequality in (i) was to be strict for every k, then supplier j
could increase his price, so this must hold with equality for some k. Given
this equality, this supplier (k) can ensure purchase by decreasing his price
slightly, so such a price reduction must not be proﬁtable, i.e. pki ≤ 0. Finally,
condition (iii) ensures that supplier j does not make a loss.
Turning to the proof of the theorem, to prove only if, note that α = (αi)i∈I
is an equilibrium of the game G if for any player i and any action aji which
is assigned positive probability by αi,
gi(a
j
i , α−i) ≥ gi(aki , α−i)∀k. (14)
In particular, if two actions aji and a
k
i are both assigned positive proba-
bility under αi, then:
gi(a
j
i , α−i) = gi(a
k
i , α−i). (15)
We now show that σ(pˆ) satisﬁes the same conditions. Let aji be an action
which is played with positive probability at pˆi, and suppose that there ex-
ists some k such that gi(a
j
i , σ−i(pˆ)) < gi(a
k
i , σ−i(pˆ)). Now p
k
i must be strictly
positive since otherwise by condition (iii) of theorem 1, gi(a
j
i , σ−i(pˆ)) + p
j
i <
gi(a
k
i , σ−i(pˆ)) + p
k
i , and σi(pˆ)i cannot be optimal for player i. Since supplier
k sells with a probability strictly less than one, he can do better by choosing
a price pκi = gi(a
k
i , α−i)− gi(aji , α−i) + pˆji − ε (ε small and positive), then he
can ensure that i chooses action k with probability one. We conclude that
gi(a
j
i , σ−i(pˆ)) ≥ gi(aki , σ−i(pˆ)). This implies also that if both aji and aki are
assigned positive probability at pˆi, then gi(a
j
i , σ−i(pˆ)) = gi(a
k
i , σ−i(pˆ)). Since
this is true for every i, this proves (i).
To prove (ii), let α be an equilibrium of G, and let σi(pˆi) = αi. If αi
randomizes across two or more actions, let pˆki = 0 ∀k. If αi assigns probability
one to a single action, aji , let pˆ
k
i = 0 ∀k = j, and let pˆki = gi(aji , α−i) −
maxk =j gi(aki , α−i).
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Proof of Theorem 2:
For each i, let any active supplier λ(a∗i ) choose his price equal to δi(a
∗),
and let every other supplier choose a price of zero. In the resulting subgame,
it is clearly an equilibrium for each player to choose a∗i . It remains to spec-
ify behavior after a deviation by any one seller, and to verify that such a
deviation is not proﬁtable.
Suppose that condition (i) holds. Let players play an arbitrary equilib-
rium in any other subgame that results after diﬀerent prices. It is clear that
no active supplier can do better by choosing a diﬀerent price, since at any
proﬁle, the maximum that he can earn is his marginal contribution, which
by assumption is smaller than δi(a
∗)
Suppose ii) holds. If active supplier λ(a∗i ) deviates by choosing a higher
price, then all players j = i continue to choose action a∗j , while player i
chooses the action
a′i ∈ arg max
ai =a∗i
gi(ai, a
∗
−i). (16)
This response by player i makes a price increase for the supplier unproﬁtable.
It remains to verify that the continuation play constitutes a Nash equilibrium
in the subgame. For player i, choosing a′i rather than a
∗
i is clearly preferable
since the price chosen by supplier λ(a∗i ) is greater than δi(a
∗). For every player
j diﬀerent from i, continuing to play a∗j is a best response since the marginal
contribution at any proﬁle (a∗j , a−j) is greater than the price δj(a
∗).
Proof of Theorem 3:
Let pˆi be such that pˆ
j
i ∈ [0, δi(aj)] and pˆki = 0 for k = j. If the chosen
price vector is pˆ, the players play aj; this is clearly optimal since pˆji ≤ δi(aj).
If supplier ij deviates and chooses a higher price, the players play α, so that
ij gets zero. Since α is an equilibrium of G, this is an equilibrium in this
subgame since only the payoﬀ to action aji , which is not in the support of
αi, has been reduced. Clearly no other supplier ik can beneﬁt by raising his
price, if the players continue to play aj after this deviation.
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